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In many countries, local governments operating on a small scale face a choice between 
amalgamation and cooperation. This paper applies a novel methodology to investigate the 
implications of this choice for operating efficiency. Using a unique micro-level dataset of 
over 11,000 loans made to both municipalities and intermunicipal organizations in the 
Netherlands, we show that the latter consistently pay higher interest rates than the former. 
That is remarkable, because credit risk is zero in both cases, and we control for loan 
characteristics like amortization and maturity. In contrast, municipal amalgamation does not 
result in higher interest rates. Possible legal or administrative costs associated with enforcing 
loan guarantees cannot explain the higher interest paid by intermunicipal organizations. That 
is because we find that public companies (which may default) do not pay higher interest rates 
than public bodies (which never default). Surprisingly, the number of partners cooperating in 
an intermunicipal organization does not affect interest rates. Thus, we find no evidence for the 
“law of 1/n”. 
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In many countries, local governments are believed to have a suboptimal scale for offering 
public services efficiently, because of scale economies and because of spending spillovers. 
That is especially true in countries where amalgamation is rare or non-existent or where 
substantial public tasks have been decentralized recently. There are several ways local 
government can increase operating scale: through amalgamation, through cooperation with 
other governments and by contracting out or partnering with the private sector.  
Contracting out requires a competitive market, which does not exist for many services for 
which local government is responsible. Where it has been applied, results have often been 
disappointing (Bel et al. 2010). The same goes for public-private partnership (Andrews and 
Entwistle 2010). This paper focuses on amalgamation and cooperation. Municipal 
amalgamations have been conducted in, e.g., Belgium (1977), New Zealand (1989), Israel 
(2003), Denmark (2007) and the Netherlands (continually), and are currently being considered 
in both Norway and Finland. Amalgamations often lead to public resistance because 
communities fear loss of autonomy or identity. In case of preference heterogeneity among the 
inhabitants of the merging jurisdictions, amalgamations may reduce allocative efficiency. 
That is because larger jurisdictions are less able to tailor local services to local demand, which 
is the basic rationale for decentralization (Oates 1972).  
Another problem with amalgamation is that it is a blunt instrument. Services offered by local 
governments are quite heterogeneous. While for some (e.g., capital intensive) services the 
local government might operate under economies of scale, for other services the opposite may 
be true. Hence, an overall upscaling could invoke efficiency gains in some public services and 
efficiency losses in others. Also, amalgamation may result in more bureaucracy, reducing 
efficiency.  
Intermunicipal cooperation offers municipalities a way to increase scale of production for 
selected public services only, while continuing to provide other public services on a municipal 
level, and preserving local autonomy. Although intermunicipal cooperation is a wide-spread 
phenomenon (Hulst and Van Montfort 2012), it has not been extensively studied. 
Cooperation may allow municipalities to exploit economies of scale and thereby improve 
efficiency, but it may also have effects that reduce efficiency. Agency theory predicts that 
cooperation exacerbates agency costs, especially as a result of dispersed ownership. 
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Intermunicipal cooperation in effect creates a common pool. When a particular municipality 
puts a lot of effort into monitoring the intermunicipal organization, most of the gains from 
that effort will benefit the other participants. As a result of this disincentive, the level of 
monitoring is likely to be lower than that for the operations of the municipality itself. This 
could lead to inefficiencies, as managers of intermunicipal organizations will have goals 
which do not necessarily match those of the cooperating municipalities.  
As this disincentive to monitor is linked to the existence of a common pool, its strength may 
depend on the size of this pool. Efficiency of intermunicipal organizations could, e.g., 
increase with the inverse of the number of participants, a phenomenon called the “law of 1/n” 
(Weingast 1979). Other theories, however, predict an “inverse law of 1/n” (Primo and Snyder 
2008), e.g., because an increase in the number of participants reduces the scope for political 
meddling, or because it creates the need to curb inefficiency lest some participants will leave.  
Empirical studies of intergovernmental cooperation often focus on the determinants of 
cooperation (e.g., Blaeschke 2014; Di Porto et al. 2013; Feiock et al. 2009; Hefetz and 
Warner 2011, LeRoux et al. 2010). Studies on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation are 
mostly case studies or survey studies (e.g., see Dollery et al. 2009). Bel and Warner 
(forthcoming) survey the literature, and find just eight econometric studies of the effect of 
cooperation on public service costs or spending. All of these study solid waste services, one of 
them in combination with water, electricity and gas (Garrone et al. 2013). Most use spending 
on solid waste collection or waste disposal fees as dependent variable; some but not all 
control for differences in output and quality. Five conclude that cooperation reduces costs 
(Bel and Costas 2006; Bel and Mur 2009; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2013; Zafra-Gómez et al. 
2013; Bel et al. 2014), two find rising costs (Sørensen 2007; Garrone et al. 2013) and one has 
insignificant results (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2014). A Dutch study finds no differences in 
efficiency between municipalities providing household solid waste services alone or in 
cooperation with other municipalities (Felsö et al. 2011). Frère et al. (2014) find no effect of 
cooperation on total spending of French municipalities.  
The empirical literature on the effects of municipal amalgamations is mixed as well. 
Lüchinger and Stutzer (2002), Hansen (2011) and Moisio and Uusitalo (2013) find higher 
spending after amalgamation, Reingewertz (2012) and Blesse and Baskaran (2013) find lower 
spending and Hanes (2014) finds lower spending for small municipalities and higher spending 
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for bigger ones. Allers and Geertsema (2014) find no effect on aggregate spending, nor on 
local house prices (used as an indicator for efficiency).  
Empirical studies of the effects of cooperation or amalgamation often focus on spending 
levels. Higher spending does not necessarily point to increased inefficiency, however. It may 
simply reflect rising public service levels. Unfortunately, efficiency of municipalities is hard 
to measure, because output is often ill-defined, heterogeneous and hard to quantify. Empirical 
studies in this field suffer from two fundamental problems (Geys and Moesen 2009). They 
have to make do with the scarce output indicators that are available, which usually are at best 
crude proxies for the true level of public good provision. Moreover, they rely on strong 
assumptions (e.g., regarding the cost function), or they are vulnerable to data errors (if data 
envelopment analysis is used to measure efficiency). Because all previous papers on the 
effects of intermunicipal cooperation focus on a service, waste, for which output is easy to 
quantify, the first problem does not necessarily apply to them. Indeed, output and quality are 
controlled for in some of these studies (e.g., Bel and Costas 2006 and Zafra-Gómez et al. 
2013).  
Our approach is completely different from that of previous studies. Whereas previous studies 
on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation on costs cover all costs of providing a single 
service, we focus on a single cost in a broad range of public services. We exploit a unique 
micro-level dataset on the price both municipalities and intermunicipal organizations pay for a 
standard commodity: credit. We compare interest rates on loans to Dutch intermunicipal 
organizations, amalgamated municipalities, and municipalities that were not amalgamated. 
The credit risk for these loans is identical (i.e., zero). Our rich dataset allows us to control for 
loan characteristics that influence interest rates. Consequently, any differences we find point 
ceteris paribus to differences in efficiency, without having to rely on strong assumptions 
inherent in the approaches chosen by previous studies.  
2. Institutional background 
Municipalities and intermunicipal organizations 
Dutch municipalities are democratically governed jurisdictions with a broad set of 
responsibilities. They depend heavily on grants provided by the central government, with 
limited power to raise taxes. Municipalities account for 25 percent of total government 
spending, which amounts to 10 percent of gdp (Allers et al. 2013). The central government 
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has decentralized many tasks to municipalities, a process that is still ongoing. Partly as a 
result of this, municipalities often cooperate to perform specific tasks, ranging from refuse 
collection to administering social welfare benefits.1 To this end, many intermunicipal 
organizations have been created. Cooperation is often aimed at reaping economies of scale. 
Other reasons to cooperate are that some municipalities are simply too small to perform every 
task independently, or that the catchment area of a public service exceeds the municipality’s 
boundaries. 
Intermunicipal organizations may take different forms (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007). There 
are no limitations with respect to the number of cooperative arrangements, and municipalities 
are free to choose different partners for each (except for some cases where cooperation is 
mandatory). The Joint Provisions Act (Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen) enables 
municipalities to create public bodies, which are separate administrative entities that may 
employ staff, own assets, borrow money, etcetera. A public body is governed by a general 
board containing members of municipal councils or aldermen from the participating 
municipalities. The general board can delegate its authority to an executive board. It is the 
general board, not the councils of the participating municipalities, that adopts the public 
body’s budget. The municipal councils may express their views on the proposed budget, but 
the public body’s board decides. 
Municipalities may also create public companies under private law. The management of 
public companies enjoys almost complete autonomy vis-à-vis local government (Hulst and 
Van Montfort 2007). The advisory and the executive boards may (partly) consist of 
representatives of the participating jurisdictions, but they must act in the interest of the 
company and are not accountable to the municipal councils.  
Apart from these two main forms, several other types exist, e.g., foundations and informal 
communities of government officials in charge of specific public services. The exact number 
of intermunicipal organizations is not known; no central register exists. However, every 
municipality participates in several, if not scores, of cooperative arrangements. 
An alternative to intermunicipal cooperation is municipal amalgamation. Almost every year, 
some Dutch municipalities are amalgamated. As a result, the number of municipalities 
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gradually decreased from 572 in 1997 to 408 in 2013. With over 40,000 inhabitants on 
average, Dutch municipalities are large compared with those in other countries (Allers and 
Geertsema 2014). 
Local government borrowing 
There are no legal limits to the amounts municipalities or intermunicipal organizations can 
borrow (Allers forthcoming). Although Dutch municipalities are legally obliged to present 
balanced budgets, this does not rule out deficit financing. Because municipalities use accrual 
accounting, expenditures to acquire assets do not burden the budget in the year of acquisition 
for the full amount, but are spread out over the economic life of the assets, in the form of 
interest and depreciation, in a way similar to that in business. Thus, a municipality may 
borrow while at the same time presenting a balanced budget.  
There is no default risk associated with loans to municipalities. Dutch municipalities never go 
bankrupt (Allers forthcoming), and neither do intermunicipal public bodies. Article 12 of the 
Financial Relations Act (Financiële verhoudingswet) stipulates that a municipality may apply 
for a supplementary grant if revenues are significantly and structurally insufficient to cover 
necessary outlays, while local tax rates are sufficiently high. This explicit bailout guarantee 
enables Dutch municipalities to borrow cheaply. According to Article 2.8 of the Regeling 
solvabiliteitseisen kredietrisico en grote posities Wft 2010 (“Rules on solvability 
requirements, credit risk and large positions”), the credit risk associated with loans to 
municipalities and intermunicipal public bodies is equal to that of loans to the central 
government. Such loans are not subject to solvency requirements, i.e., the bank is not required 
to hold more capital if it makes more of these loans. 
Unlike public bodies, public companies sometimes go bankrupt, although this happens rarely. 
Some of the loans to such companies are guaranteed by local governments. Those loans are 
not subject to solvency requirements as credit risk is zero. If necessary, the bank will contact 
the municipality acting as a guarantor and receive its money back. Non-guaranteed debt of 
public companies does carry credit risk, and is excluded from this study. 
Loans must be approved by the municipality’s board of aldermen or the general board of the 
intermunicipal organization, or by a civil servant mandated by the relevant board. A 
representative of the municipality or the intermunicipal organization contacts the client desk 
of one or more financial institutions, sets out the specifics of the requested loan, and is offered 
an interest rate. After selecting the best offer, the loan is quickly arranged. 
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Lending to local government 
Two Dutch banks specialize in loans to local governments, BNG Bank and NWB bank. Both 
enjoy triple-A ratings.2 Apart from these banks, of which shares are held by the central 
government and subnational governments, municipalities and intermunicipal organizations 
may borrow from commercial banks. As bank loans are easily available, local governments do 
not normally issue bonds. Credit ratings of individual municipalities are not available. 
In 2012, the most recent year for which this figure is available, subnational public bodies 
(mostly, but not exclusively, intermunicipal bodies) had a combined debt of 3.6 billion euro.3 
Countrywide data on debt of other intermunicipal organizations is not available. In the same 
year, intermunicipal organizations owed BNG Bank 3.5 billion euro and NWB Bank 0.5 
billion euro.4 Intermunicipal public bodies account for 1 billion (BNG) and 0.2 billion (NWB) 
of these totals. Outstanding debt of municipalities totaled 46 billion euro in 2012.5 Of this, 27 
billion euro was owed to BNG Bank and 7 billion euro to NWB Bank.6 
We interviewed representatives of BNG Bank on the way interest rates are set.7 To make long 
term loans, BNG Bank borrows money on the international capital market. The proceeds of 
the bonds issues, paying a fixed interest rate, are swapped to Euribor (European inter-bank 
offered rates) immediately to mitigate interest risk. Short term funding is obtained through the 
money market. Short term lending rates are based on Euribor rates, long term lending rates are 
based on swap rates. Before the start of every business day, the bank builds a so called pricing 
yield curve by first connecting the funding interest rates for different maturities, and then 
adding surcharges for profit and cost (which may depend on principal and maturity), a 
liquidity premium (if applicable) 8 and a surcharge for cost of capital (“usage of balance 
sheet”).  
The pricing yield curve gives a norm price on which the actual interest rate of a loan is based. 
Actual interest rates usually differ from this norm price; they are a result of negotiations 
                                                 
2
 In 2013, one of the three major credit rating agencies downgraded the rating of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
to AA+. As a result, the rating of these banks was downgraded as well by this agency.  
3
 Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
4
 Sources: internal data BNG Bank; NWB (2013). 
5
 Source: Statistics Netherlands. This includes debts to non-banks (e.g., unpaid bills). 
6
 Sources: internal data BNG Bank; NWB (2013). 
7
 We interviewed a member of the Board of Directors and persons working at the client desk of the bank. 
8
 A liquidity premium was introduced during the financial crisis of 2008, when international credit market 
liquidity was low. 
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between the lender and the borrower. E.g., lower rates may be offered to attract extra business 
on days with ample supply, or when the interest rate on the international market has gone 
down during the day after the pricing yield curve has been fixed. Borrowers who are aware of 
the latter are likely to secure better deals than borrowers who do not spend time to collect 
market information. 
Sometimes long term loans have a forward start. This means that the borrowed money is not 
made available on the day the loan is arranged (and the interest rate set), but at a later date. 
Interest rates on loans with a forward start are usually higher, because pricing is based on 
immediately borrowing by the bank, on the capital market, until maturity, and lending to a 
third party against a usually lower rate for the period until the loan starts. The resulting loss in 
the first period has to be compensated by a premium on the interest rate during the second 
period, leading to a higher interest rate. A forward start can be attractive because it provides 
the borrower with certainty about the interest to be paid, even though the loan has not actually 
started yet, or because the borrower anticipates rising interest rates. It may also be convenient 
for intermunicipal organizations where loans have to be approved by a board that does not 
meet very often. It that case, the board may also give permission to borrow money on certain 
conditions at a later moment.  
3. Theory and hypotheses 
Risk and interest rate 
Suppose that a bank can choose between two options. This first is a risk-free investment 
earning a return of ∗ = 1 + ∗. The second option is a loan to a borrower  who will default 
with probability 	, at interest rate 	. In case of default, the bank recoups a proportion 
 of the 
loan, but this is accompanied by extra costs , such as judicial or procedural costs. Assume  
is fixed, i.e., independent of , the size of the loan. If borrower  does not default, the bank 
lends  and gets back 	, so the return of investment is 	. In case of default, the bank 
receives 
	 − , so the return is  . 
Risk neutrality implies that the loan should have the same expected return as the risk-free 
investment: 
 ∗ = 1 − 		 + 	 
	 −  (1) 
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For Dutch municipalities and public bodies, which never default, 	 is zero and the required 
rate of return equals the risk-free rate of return: 
 		 	!"#	$% = 	!&#	 	&()% = ∗ (3) 
For public companies, default risk is positive, but credit risk is zero, as their debt is 
guaranteed by default-free municipalities.9 This means that 
, the proportion of the return that 
the lender recoups in case of default, equals 1. However, some effort might be needed (and 
thus costs  be made) in case of financial distress for the borrower, despite the official legal 
mechanisms in place for such situations. Thus, for public companies, equation (2) simplifies 
into: 
 	!&#	 	 (!"% = ∗ + 	

 (4) 
The above implies that there is no theoretical reason for banks to require different interest 
rates for loans to municipalities and to public bodies (equation 3). Loans to public companies 
may carry more interest if enforcing loan guarantees in case of default is costly (equation 4). 
However, interest rates are not determined solely by the rate of return the bank requires; they 
are the result of negotiations between lenders and borrowers. The outcomes of these 
negotiations are the result of the effort put in by both parties, where the effort put in by the 
borrower is expected to be determined by the extent to which efficiency is monitored.  
Monitoring 
The decision to outsource tasks to private firms complicates the decision making process. 
Agency theory describes how monitoring, sanctions and awards are needed to align the 
agent’s objectives with those of the principal (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983). This carries 
transaction costs with it. Stewardship theory suggests that such costs are lower when tasks are 
carried out by other governmental organizations, as objectives are likely to be more aligned in 
that case (Van Slyke 2007). However, it seems that monitoring in such cases is less 
                                                 
9
 We abstract from operational risk, which includes, e.g., the possibility that contractual stipulations prove 
unenforceable or have been incorrectly documented. 
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productive, because of the difficulty to induce service-providing governments to react to the 
contracting government’s evaluation of the services provided, due to weak sanctioning power 
(Marvel and Marvel 2008).  
Corporate governance theory suggests that, in the case of intermunicipal cooperation, there is 
an additional problem: dispersed ownership (Sørensen 2007). Public services provided 
through intermunicipal cooperation are financed from a common pool; hence, the costs are 
shared with other municipalities. Consequently, when a municipality decides on the amount 
of effort (cost) that should be put into monitoring an intermunicipal organization, it will take 
into account that any gains from putting in that effort will only partly benefit the municipality 
itself, since they will be shared with all other participants. This is likely to result in a level of 
monitoring that is lower than that for the operations of the municipality itself. According to 
corporate governance theory, this incentive for undermonitoring will lead to inefficient 
service provision. It allows functionaries of intermunicipal organizations to engage in, e.g., 
budget-maximizing behavior (Niskanen 1971).  
However, the public choice literature provides a different perspective, with a different 
outcome. According to this literature, citizens are unable to effectively oversee their elected 
representatives. This allows politicians to collect rent: they can divert public resources to 
further their own goals, e.g., to improve their chances to be reelected. Decision making in 
intermunicipal organizations is further removed from politicians than decision making in 
municipalities. As a result, it is more difficult for politicians to exploit the organization’s 
resources as transaction costs are higher (Sørensen 2007).  
Thus, theoretically, intermunicipal cooperation may result in lower efficiency because of 
reduced monitoring (agency theory), and to higher efficiency because of less political 
meddling (public choice). The net effect is uncertain. However, in the case we study, 
borrowing money, political meddling seems to be less relevant. It is hard to see how 
politicians could benefit from intermunicipal organizations paying unnecessarily high interest 
rates. We hypothesize that intermunicipal cooperation reduces monitoring effort and therefore 
leads to higher interest costs:  




Amalgamation, which is an alternative to cooperation, might also affect monitoring effort. It 
is conceivable that recently amalgamated municipalities are not able to monitor their 
borrowing activities as well as municipalities that did not amalgamate. Amalgamation is an 
arduous process that may have severe disruptive effects on managerial behavior and 
organizational outcomes, e.g., because of poor staff morale, loss of managerial expertise due 
to increased turnover, and work overload (Andrews and Boyne 2012). On the other hand, 
amalgamation might have a beneficial effect on efficiency. Existing organizations usually 
have well established ways of doing things, which might have become outdated. 
Amalgamation forces organizations to reconsider procedures and operations, possibly 
resulting in the adoption of more efficient practices (Hansen et al. 2014). Again, the net effect 
is uncertain. We hypothesize that the first, efficiency-reducing, effect dominates, but that it is 
smaller than for cooperation: 
Hypothesis 2a: in the first few years after amalgamation, municipalities pay 
higher interest rates than not (recently) amalgamated municipalities. 
Hypothesis 2b: interest rates paid by recently amalgamated municipalities are 
lower than those paid by intermunicipal organizations. 
We expect that the extent to which intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates than 
municipalities depends on two crucial characteristics of such organizations. The first is legal 
form. Because public bodies are default-free and public companies are not, different risk-free 
rates of return apply (see equation 3 and 4, respectively). For public companies, costs T might 
be involved in case of default (equation 4). Thus, we expect public companies to pay higher 
interest rates than public bodies: 
Hypothesis 3: interest rates paid by public companies are higher than those paid 
by public bodies. 
The second characteristic of intermunicipal organizations that may affect the interest rate is 
the number of cooperating municipalities. Several papers argue that inefficiency due to 
common pool effects increases with the number of participants, a phenomenon called the “law 
of 1/n” (Weingast 1979; Weingast et al. 1981; Primo and Snyder 2008). Originally, this law is 
based on models where (i) individual legislators care mainly about the public projects that 
flow into their own districts (or benefit their inhabitants), (ii) funding of public projects is 
fixed and not connected to individual projects and (iii) all projects proposed are passed. 
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Although empirical findings supporting this hypothesis are presented by several authors (e.g., 
Baquir 2002; Bradbury and Stephenson 2003), others have raised questions.  
Primo and Snyder (2008) argue that the effect of the number of participants depends on 
factors like the degree of publicness of the goods provided. They also give examples of cases 
where a “reverse law of 1/n“ may hold. This is in line with Tornell and Lane (1999), who 
propose a non-monotonic relationship between the number of competing powerful groups in 
an economy and the growth rate of the efficient sector: a shift from n = 1 to n = 2 reduces 
efficiency, while, starting at n ≥ 2, a further increase reduces power concentration and 
improves outcomes. Tornell and Lane (1999) model a situation where each participant has an 
outside option. This means that, for the most efficient organization as well as for others, 
participating must be at least as attractive as leaving. As n goes up, inefficiency must be 
curbed to satisfy that condition. As municipalities are free to join or leave intermunicipal 
organizations, this model is relevant here.  
The public choice literature provides another reason to expect a “reverse law of 1/n“ to apply. 
As describe above, according to this literature, decision making in intermunicipal 
organizations may be more efficient because it is further removed from politicians than 
decision making in municipalities. As the number of participants grows, it gets more difficult 
for politicians from one of them to exploit the organization’s resources, as transaction costs 
are higher. This suggests a “reverse law of 1/n“. 
Thus, theoretically, a higher number of cooperating municipalities may result in lower 
efficiency because of reduced monitoring, and to higher efficiency because exit should remain 
unattractive and because of less political meddling. The net effect is uncertain. Leaving an 
intermunicipal organization and setting up an operation on one’s own will probably be 
unattractive in many cases, especially where service provision is capital-intensive. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that the first effects dominates.  
Hypothesis 4: the interest rate paid by intermunicipal organizations is higher if the 
number of participating municipalities is higher (i.e. the “law of 1/n” holds). 
4. Method and data 
Our units of observation are individual loans. We have data on four types of loans with fixed 
interest rates made by BNG Bank, which is the market leader in this field: 
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1) Short term loans (up to one year) where payment of principal and interest is due at 
maturity. 
2) Long term loans where amortization and interest is paid in equal installments 
(Annuity).  
3) Long term loan where the principal is paid back in equal installments (Linear). 
4) Long term loans where the principal is paid back at maturity (Bullet). 
Purchase or sale of loans, refinancing, restructuring, consolidation of loans and loans with no 
fixed interest rate or standard amortization schedules are left out of our selection. We select 
loans to municipalities and public bodies, which both never default in the Netherlands, and 
loans to public companies which are guaranteed by municipalities. All loans in our sample are 
officially free of credit risk. 
Interest rates vary a lot over time and over amortization schemes. In order to compare interest 
rates of different loans, we relate them to reference interest rates that apply to the same dates 
and amortization schedules. Our dependent variable is the interest rate differential (IRD), 
defined as the relative difference between the actual interest rate * on loan + and the reference 
interest rate ,-.: /0* =
,1,234
,234
. We use a relative measure because different loan types have 
different interest rates, and because interest fluctuates considerably over time. The IRD may 
be interpreted as follows: if, e.g., intermunicipal organizations have an average IRD that is 
0.05 higher than that of municipalities, then, other things being equal, they spend 5 percent 
more on interest payments.10 
We use the interest rate indicated by BNG Bank’s pricing yield curve as the reference interest 
rate. Although the bank keeps records of pricing yield curves for many years back, these data 
are not available for all possible maturities. For long term loans, reference rates based on the 
bank’s pricing yield curve are available for the most common maturities only: both 5 and 10 
years for bullet loans, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years for loans with linear amortization and 10, 15, 
                                                 
10
 More precisely, if the IRD of intermunicipal organizations exceeds the IRD of municipalities by x, the former 
pay 5 ,234,6789: as much in interest. That is because /0
	$-, = /0	 	!+x implies  ,8;326,234,234 =
,6789:,234
,234
+ 5. Rewriting yields ,8;326,6789:,6789: = 5
,234
,6789:
.	 As the average value of ,234,6789: in our 
sample is 1.02, this factor will usually be negligible. Thus, if we find a difference in IRD of 0.05, that implies 
that 5.1 percent more is paid on interest (0.05 × 1.02 × 100%).  
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20 and 25 years for loans with annuity amortization.11 We select loans for which reference 
rates are available, and exclude loans with less common maturities from our basic analysis. In 
our sensitivity analysis, we will check whether this affects results. 
For each loan, BNG Bank creates a paper file and a record in its computer system. We were 
allowed to use data from the latter, for 1997–2013. For short term loans, however, data is 
available for 2006-2013 only, because the bank’s (computerized) administration does not 
allow going further back in time. For each loan, we have data on the identity of the borrower 
and on the loan characteristics that influence interest rates. These include date of contract, 
amortization schedule, principal borrowed, maturity and forward start (number of days 
between contract and start of the loan).  
At this point, we have to decide whether or not to control for such loan characteristics in our 
regressions. It could be argued that borrowers should choose loan characteristics which 
minimize interest payments, under the restriction that enough funds are available at the 
moments these are needed. Controlling for loan characteristics would then eliminate 
inefficiencies resulting from poor treasury management. For municipalities, loans are not 
usually linked to specific investments. Rather, the municipality’s treasurer reviews the entire 
capital needs of his or her organization and borrows accordingly. Loan characteristics such as 
amortization schedule, principal borrowed, maturity and forward start can then be chosen to 
minimize interest payments. Municipal organizations, however, usually borrow money for 
specific projects. Thus, their choice with respect to such characteristics is more limited. For 
that reason, we decide to control for loan characteristics. In that way, we compare interest 
paid on equivalent loans. In our regressions, we use principal, maturity and forward start as 
controls, and we run separate regressions for different amortization schedules. In order to 
allow for non-linearity, we also include the square of these variables. Furthermore, we include 
year dummies to control for nationwide factors influencing IRDs.  
Data taken from the bank’s administration are combined with data we collected through a 
survey of intermunicipal organizations. We collected data on the number of participating 
municipalities, on the field of activity and on their legal form. These variables are not all 
constant over time; especially the number of partners may vary as municipalities join, leave or 
amalgamate. For some organizations, we were unable to collect all data for all relevant years. 
                                                 
11
 For 5 year loans with linear amortization, reference interest rates are available from July 16, 1999 onward. 
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It proved especially difficult to gather data for the earlier years of our research period. We 
define number of partners as equal to 1 in case of loans to municipalities and equal to the 
number of participating municipalities for loans to intermunicipal organizations. 
For all municipalities, we collected data on amalgamations. We construct two dummy 
variables: one indicating whether a municipality has been amalgamated in the year of the loan 
or up to 3 years before, and one indicating whether it has been amalgamated 4-8 years before 
the loan was made. This way we can discriminate between short run and long term effects of 
amalgamation. 
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of IRDs for municipalities and for intermunicipal 
organizations. Although most observations are in the range [-0.1, 0.1], the distribution 
exhibits long tails on both sides. That might be problematic, e.g., in case these result from 
data errors, especially if systematic differences exist between municipalities and municipal 
organizations. To investigate this, we accessed the paper files of the ten loans with highest 
IRDs and the ten loans with lowest IRDs, both for short term loans and for long term loans, 
and both for municipalities and for intermunicipal organizations, i.e., 80 loans in total. Table 1 
summarizes the results. For long term loans, a forward start is the most common reason for an 
extremely high IRD (six out of ten cases, for both municipalities and intermunicipal 
organizations). In two cases, this coincided with a price guarantee, where intermunicipal 
organizations pay extra to secure the right to borrow at a certain IRD in a certain period. A 






Figure 1. Frequency distribution of IRDs for municipalities and for intermunicipal 
organizations (percentages) 
 
One high IRD was the result of a mistake made by the client desk of the bank, and three 
outliers proved to be data errors (in the computerized data we use). For long term loans, the 
reason for very low IRDs is, apart from one data error, that the bank sometimes offers interest 
rates below the reference rate given by the pricing yield curve, e.g., when market rates drop 
during the day (the pricing curve is fixed before business starts, early in the morning).  
For short term loans, small loan size and price guarantee explain most of the very high IRDs; 
there was one data error. Very low IRDs are caused by large loan sizes, mistakes made by the 
bank’s client desk, and, in two cases, a borrower with a strong bargaining position. In these 
cases, the representative from the intermunicipal organization which took up the loan had 
recently negotiated cheap, big loans for a municipality, and demanded the same low IRD, 
which the bank accepted. 
The only systematic difference between municipalities and municipal organizations we find 
among these outliers is that the latter sometimes pay a premium in order to get a price 
guarantee. This is not observed in our dataset, so we cannot control for it in our regressions. 
In most cases, outliers are related to forward start and loan size, which we do control for. 
However, the number of data errors is rather high among outliers. In order to avoid results 
driven by outliers, we exclude observations where the absolute value of IRD exceeds 0.25 
from our main analysis. In our sensitivity analysis, we will check whether our results are 

























Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. Our dataset contains 11,307 observations, of which 
10,313 are loans to 433 different municipalities, and 994 are loans to 113 different 
intermunicipal organizations. In those 113 intermunicipal organizations, 389 different 
municipalities participate, ranging from very small to very large. Table A1 in the Appendix 
offers a detailed breakdown of the dataset by loan type and borrower characteristics.  
5. Comparing interest paid by intermunicipal organizations, amalgamated 
municipalities and not-amalgamated municipalities 
In this section, we test whether there exist significant differences between IRDs of 
intermunicipal organizations and municipalities (hypothesis 1), municipalities which are 
amalgamated and municipalities which are not (hypothesis 2a), and intermunicipal 
organizations and amalgamated municipalities (hypothesis 2b). In the next section, we 
examine whether intermunicipal organizations’ characteristics affect IRDs. 
It is obvious from Figure 1 that IRDs are often higher for intermunicipal organizations. 
However, this may be due to differences in loan characteristics or timing. To test whether the 
type of organization really matters, we conduct a number of regression analyses. Reported 
standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity and for correlation between observations for 
identical organizations. 
Basic results 
Table 3 shows regressions of IRDs on a dummy that takes the value of one if the loan was 
made to an intermunicipal organization, and on a number of control variables. The first 
column includes all loans in our dataset. Columns 2-5 concern specific types of loans. In 
many cases, the control variables are highly significant, especially for long term loans which 
are more heterogeneous than short term loans. Overall, the variables included in the 
regression explain differences in IRDs quite well.  
We now turn to the central question of this paper: do intermunicipal organizations pay higher 
interest rates than municipalities? The answer is surprisingly straightforward. The coefficients 
of the intermunicipal organization dummy are positive and highly significant for all loan 
types. On average, the IRD for intermunicipal organizations is 0.027 (linear amortization) to 
0.048 (short term loans) higher than for municipalities. Intermunicipal organizations pay 3-5 
percent more interest on equivalent loans. This confirms hypothesis 1.  
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Thus, presumably, intermunicipal organizations could pay less interest, but no doubt this 
would require more effort (collecting market information; negotiating). Would that be cost 
effective? A rough calculation can put this into perspective. For intermunicipal organizations 
in our sample, average loan size is 4.9 million euro and average interest rate 1.7 percent 
(Table 2). Thus, yearly interest paid on the average loan is 83,000 euro. Paying 3-5 percent 
more in interest means paying 2,500 – 4,000 euro more annually. Over 3.8 years (average 
maturity, Table 2) that amounts to 10,000-15,000 euro per loan. Assuming wage costs of 
100,000 euro (rather generous) and 228 working days per year (the Dutch average), 10,000 
euro buys 23 days of staff. Thus, spending an extra couple of hours or even days in order to 
secure a lower interest rate would be a very profitable investment. This suggests that 
intermunicipal organizations borrow inefficiently. 
Table 4 reports estimates of similar regressions as in Table 3, but with two amalgamation 
dummy variables added (coefficients of control variables are not reported). The coefficient of 
none of these is significant for any of the loan types. Municipal amalgamation does not affect 
IRDs, neither in the short run nor in the long run. Thus, hypothesis 2a, which states that 
amalgamation temporarily leads to higher interest rates, is rejected. Moreover, this confirms 
hypothesis 2b, that amalgamated municipalities have lower IRDs than intermunicipal 
organizations.  
Sensitivity analysis 
We test the robustness of the findings described above in three ways. First, we re-run the 
regressions including uncommon maturities for which no reference interest rates are available, 
using interpolated values for reference interest rates. Secondly, we drop municipalities that do 
not participate in at least one of the intermunicipal organizations we study from the analysis. 
Finally, we allow previously excluded observations with an IRD above 0.25 or below -0.25 in 
our regressions, and apply different thresholds. 
Because reference interest rates for long term loans are only available for the most common 
maturities, we excluded observations with other maturities from the analysis. This may have 
affected our conclusions. In order to check this, we now include all maturities. To find the 
reference interest rates for non-common maturities, we linearly interpolate the reference rates 
that are available. E.g., we find the reference rate for a 12 year loan by interpolating the rate 
for a 10 year loan and that of a 15 year loan. For relatively short terms, we interpolate 
between the 1 year Euribor rate and the lowest available swap reference rate. For long term 
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loans, over 10 years for bullet loans and over 25 for other long term loans, we use the 
reference rate for 10 years and 25 years, respectively. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the 
results of regressions similar to those in Table 4, but including observations with non-standard 
maturities. Columns 2 of both tables are identical, because reference rates are available for all 
short term loans. The R-squared values are somewhat lower in Table A2, which is not 
surprising as our method of interpolating and extrapolating reference interest rates is rather 
crude (yield curves not normally being linear). The coefficients of the intermunicipal 
organization dummy are hardly affected, though. Now, we do find a significant short-term 
effect of amalgamation, but only at the 10 percent confidence level, and only for bullet loans. 
We conclude that our basic results are not affected by exclusion of loans with non-standard 
maturities. 
It might be argued that the decision to cooperate may not be independent of a municipality’s 
efficiency. E.g., efficient municipalities could be less likely to cooperate because they already 
enjoy low costs, or more likely to cooperate because they are more attractive partners. In that 
case, we would be comparing intermunicipal organizations, which comprise relatively 
(in)efficient municipalities, with a group of both inefficient and efficient municipalities. As 
we have seen, however, the intermunicipal organizations included in our database have 
participants from 389 different municipalities, while the total number of municipalities was 
572 in 1997 and 408 in 2013. Thus, the majority of municipalities participates in the 
intermunicipal organizations we study. Still, as a robustness check, we dropped municipalities 
that do not participate in at least one of the intermunicipal organizations we study and ran the 
regressions in Table 4 again. The results are virtually identical (see Table A3 in the 
Appendix). 
In order to prevent outliers from influencing our results, we excluded observations with an 
IRD above 0.25 or below -0.25 from our regressions. We now test whether our conclusions 
change if we include these observations, or if we instead set a lower threshold. Table A4 in 
the Appendix shows results of regressions similar to those in Table 3, reporting only the 
coefficients of the intermunicipal organization dummy and the number of observations. 
Column 1 presents coefficients from regressions where observations with extreme IRDs are 
not excluded. Column 2 presents coefficients from the main analysis as reported in Table 3, 
excluding IRDs above 0.25 or below -0.25. We see that including extreme observations 
strongly increases the coefficient for short term loans, while the coefficients for the other loan 
types are hardly affected. In Columns 3–5, we exclude observations with an absolute IRD 
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above 0.15, 0.10 and 0.05, respectively. Obviously, the coefficients are downwardly affected, 
but they stay positive and highly significant in all cases. Thus, our results are not driven by 
IRDs of a specific magnitude. 
6. Effect of intermunicipal organizations’ characteristics on IRDs 
Having established that intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates than 
municipalities, and that municipal amalgamation does not affect interest rates, we now turn to 
possible relevant characteristics of intermunicipal organizations. Table 5 presents regression 
results for intermunicipal organizations only. Thus, municipalities are excluded from these 
regressions. As extra control variables we add dummies representing the fields in which these 
organizations are active. That is because in some fields, a particular legal form or number of 
participants is more prevalent than in others. The control variables concerning individual loan 
characteristics (as shown in Table 3) are included as well, but we do not report their 
coefficients. 
First, we consider legal form. Because public companies can (and sometimes do) go bankrupt 
and public bodies cannot, lenders might want to charge the former higher interest rates in 
order to cover costs associated with enforcing loan guarantees (equation 4). One might even 
argue that our result that intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates may be driven 
partly by this reason. In that case, we would expect public companies to pay higher interest 
rates than public bodies (hypothesis 3). In Table 5 we test whether the legal form of 
intermunicipal organizations affects the IRD. Our dataset does not contain any annuity or 
bullet loans to public companies (see Table A1 in the Appendix), which explains the blanks in 
those columns. For the other loan types, the coefficients of the dummy variable public body 
are far from significant. That means that there is no difference in interest rates compared with 
public companies. Thus, we find no evidence supporting hypothesis 3. That is not entirely 
surprising. Defaults of public companies are exceptional in the Netherlands. Moreover, when 
interviewing officials of BNG Bank, we were informed that the costs of retrieving a loan in 
such a case are negligible, as the municipalities that guaranteed it pay up swiftly.  
Next we consider the number of participants (n) which, in our dataset, can be as high as 35 
(Table 2). In order to directly test the “law of 1/n”, we include 1/n in the regressions. For none 
of the loan types do we find a significant coefficient (Table 5). If we enter n, rather than 1/n, 
into the regressions, the coefficient for linear loans is significant at the 10 percent confidence 
level; for other loan types, the coefficients are again insignificant (not shown in Table 5). 
 21 
 
Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported. Intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates, but 
this is not linked to the number of cooperating partners. 
The coefficients of the control variables representing fields of activity do not point to 
consistently higher interest rates paid by organizations active in specific fields, although some 
coefficients are significant for one or two loan types. Note that, for some combinations of 
field of activity and loan type, we have few or even no observations (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix).  
7. Conclusions 
In many countries, local governments operating on a small scale face a choice between 
amalgamation and cooperation in order to increase their scale of operation. This paper applies 
a novel methodology to investigate the implications of this choice for operating efficiency.  
We compare the price Dutch intermunicipal organizations, amalgamated municipalities and 
not-amalgamated municipalities pay for an identical commodity: risk-free credit. We find that 
intermunicipal organizations pay significantly higher interest rates, even after controlling for 
loan characteristics like principal and maturity. Amalgamation, often seen as an alternative to 
cooperation, does not lead to higher interest rates.  
The higher interest paid by intermunicipal organizations cannot be explained by possible legal 
or administrative costs associated with recouping loaned money after the default of public 
companies. That is because there is no significant difference in interest on loans to public 
companies (which may default, but which borrow under guarantee from the participating 
municipalities) and public bodies (which never default). Moreover, we show that it is 
extremely unlikely that the higher interest rates paid by intermunicipal organizations are 
justified by savings on staff costs because less time is spent on negotiating interest rates. 
Consequently, we interpret the higher interest paid by intermunicipal organizations as a form 
of inefficiency. The outcome that cooperation leads to higher interest costs is consistent with 
corporate governance theory, but not with public choice theory. Corporate governance theory 
suggests that dispersed ownership reduces monitoring and thus increases inefficiency. 
The number of cooperating municipalities does not influence interest rates of intermunicipal 
organizations. Thus, we find no evidence supporting the “law of 1/n”. This implies that it is 
cooperation as such that results in higher interest rates (the difference between n = 1 and n > 
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1), not the number of parties involved once the choice for cooperation has been made. The 
absence of such an effect might be the result of opposite forces. Consistent with corporate 
governance theory, more partners might result in less monitoring, which could drive up costs. 
On the other hand, because each participant has an outside option, inefficiency must be 
curbed to prevent the most efficient organization from leaving.  
Previous econometric research on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation on costs is scarce 
and almost exclusively focused on one particular service: solid waste collection. We add to 
the literature by showing that, in the Netherlands, intermunicipal organizations providing a 
wide array of different services pay significantly more interest than municipalities, even 
though there does not seem to be an economic requirement to do so. Of course, interest is only 
one of many costs affecting efficiency. It would be an interesting subject for future research to 
investigate whether municipal cooperation creates inefficiencies that extend beyond paying 
unnecessarily high interest rates.  
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Explanations for IRD outliers 
 Municipality Intermunicipal organization 
Long term loans 
High IRD   
Forward start 6 6 
Small loan 0 4 
Price guarantee 0 2 
Mistake (too high interest rate offered & accepted) 1 0 
Data error 3 0 
Low IRD   
Low rate offered because of market conditions 10 9 
Data error 0 1 
Short term loans 
High IRD   
Small loan 9 0 
Price guarantee 0 9 
Data error 1 1 
Low IRD   
Big loan 10 6 
Mistake (too low interest rate offered) 0 2 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 N mean st.dev min max 
Entire sample 
Interest rate 11,307 2.095 1.924 0.050 6.820 
Principal (million euro) 11,307 7.663 12.25 0.091 278.495 
Maturity (years) 11,307 5.977 8.413 0 25 
Forward start (days) 11,307 25.34 129.4 0 2,193 
Number of partners 11,307 1.543 2.399 1 35 
IRD 11,307 -0.012 0.084 -0.250 0.250 
Intermunicipal organizations 
Interest rate 994 1.684 1.561 0.090 5.620 
Principal (million euro) 994 4.911 8.273 0.010 66.086 
Maturity (years) 994 3.782 6.502 0 25 
Forward start (days) 994 15.59 74.20 0 923 
Number of partners 994 7.178 5.539 2 35 
IRD 994 0.027 0.072 -0.248 0.250 
This Table describes the observations used in regressions reported in Tables 3-5, i.e., excluding observations 





Regressions of IRD: basic analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
Intermunicipal organization 0.0430*** 0.0476*** 0.0450*** 0.0271*** 0.0437*** 
 (0.00405) (0.00537) (0.00999) (0.00330) (0.00842) 
Principal (million euro) -0.000838** -0.000897* -0.000917 -0.000603*** -0.000602** 
 (0.000399) (0.000505) (0.000795) (0.000155) (0.000243) 
Principal squared 3.33e-06 3.49e-06 2.73e-05 6.22e-06*** 3.46e-06 
 (3.03e-06) (3.38e-06) (2.25e-05) (2.06e-06) (3.70e-06) 
Maturity (years) -0.00170*** -0.00607 -0.00850*** 0.00194***  
 (0.000542) (0.0134) (0.00299) (0.000661)  
Maturity squared 5.10e-05*** 0.00365 0.000238*** -5.61e-05*** 4.58e-05 
 (1.68e-05) (0.00842) (8.45e-05) (1.89e-05) (4.30e-05) 
Forward start (days) 0.000210*** 0.00158 0.000215*** 0.000195*** 0.000339*** 
 (1.41e-05) (0.00142) (1.37e-05) (1.40e-05) (4.45e-05) 
Forward start squared -6.14e-08*** -4.38e-05 -7.03e-08*** -4.62e-08*** -2.07e-07*** 
 (1.01e-08) (6.08e-05) (9.50e-09) (8.10e-09) (4.90e-08) 
      
Observations 11,307 6,822 309 3,676 500 
R-squared 0.206 0.160 0.709 0.695 0.674 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Regressions of IRD on cooperation and amalgamation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
Intermunicipal organization 0.0424*** 0.0464*** 0.0468*** 0.0272*** 0.0437*** 
 (0.00419) (0.00564) (0.00930) (0.00331) (0.00842) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before -0.00334 -0.0119 0.0140 0.00129 8.50e-05 
 (0.00593) (0.00993) (0.0105) (0.00122) (0.00411) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00461 -0.00757 0.000540 -0.000200 0.000217 
 (0.00485) (0.00790) (0.00442) (0.00145) (0.00355) 
      
Observations 11,307 6,822 309 3,676 500 
R-squared 0.206 0.161 0.713 0.695 0.674 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Regressions of IRD of intermunicipal organizations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
Legal form: public body 0.00214 0.00263  0.00655  
 (0.0120) (0.0140)  (0.0125)  
Inverse of number of partners (1/n) -0.0295 -0.0152 -0.484 -0.0118 -0.0863 
 (0.0383) (0.0586) (3.585) (0.0259) (0.0545) 
Field: welfare provision -0.0226 -0.0172 0.190 -0.0509***  
 (0.0190) (0.0211) (1.849) (0.0128)  
Field: work provision for disabled -0.00734 0.00449 -0.328 -0.0365*** -0.0427** 
 (0.00978) (0.0102) (0.383) (0.0103) (0.0155) 
Field: environmental services 0.00806 0.0241** 0.0350 -0.0223* -0.0194 
 (0.0107) (0.0102) (0.435) (0.0129) (0.0246) 
Field: public health -0.00559 -0.0145  -0.0166 0.00632 
 (0.0131) (0.0240)  (0.0151) (0.0415) 
Field: public safety -0.00975 -0.00673 -0.286 -0.0399*** -0.0579*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0217) (0.558) (0.0117) (0.0152) 
Field: business development 0.0123 0.0138   -0.00455 
 (0.0187) (0.0202)   (0.0130) 
      
Observations 889 631 25 197 36 
R-squared 0.095 0.081 0.959 0.386 0.970 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls and year dummies included 







Number of observations by amortization schedule 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
  
Intermunicipal organization 994 698 28 231 37 
Municipality, amalgamated 0-3 years before 640 289 23 309 19 
Municipality, amalgamated 4-8 years before 915 530 19 326 40 
Municipality, not recently amalgamated 8,758 5,305 239 2,810 404 
Total 11,307 6,822 309 3,676 500 
  
 Intermunicipal organizations: field of activity 
Welfare provision 41 36 2 3 0 
Work provision for disabled 529 404 3 116 6 
Environmental services 70 37 5 27 1 
Public health 43 19 0 21 3 
Public safety 98 29 16 47 6 
Business development 120 115 0 0 5 
Other 93 58 2 17 16 
Total 994 698 28 231 37 
  
 Intermunicipal organizations: legal form 
Public body 799 553 25 185 36 
Public company 90 78 0 12 0 
Unknown 105 67 3 34 1 
Total 994 698 28 231 37 
This Table describes the observations used in regressions reported in Tables 3-5, i.e., excluding 






Regressions of IRD with observations with interpolated reference interest rates included 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
Intermunicipal organization 0.0421*** 0.0464*** 0.0417*** 0.0294*** 0.0511*** 
 (0.00378) (0.00564) (0.00869) (0.00306) (0.00652) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before -0.00132 -0.0119 0.0147 0.00110 0.0185* 
 (0.00520) (0.00993) (0.0109) (0.00148) (0.00943) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00258 -0.00757 0.00390 -0.000668 0.0161 
 (0.00469) (0.00790) (0.00496) (0.00162) (0.00991) 
      
Observations 12,643 6,822 448 4,121 1,252 
R-squared 0.206 0.161 0.585 0.648 0.453 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Regressions of IRDs with only municipalities that participate in intermunicipal organizations included in 
regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
Intermunicipal organization 0.0398*** 0.0438*** 0.0500*** 0.0267*** 0.0441*** 
 (0.00468) (0.00636) (0.00952) (0.00329) (0.00914) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before 0.000734 -0.00620 0.0210 0.00162 -0.000906 
 (0.00719) (0.0110) (0.0129) (0.00138) (0.00587) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00399 -0.00632 0.000377 0.000474 0.00519 
 (0.00564) (0.00848) (0.00536) (0.00190) (0.00389) 
      
Observations 8,715 5,405 235 2,737 338 
R-squared 0.208 0.168 0.748 0.689 0.664 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Regressions of IRD with observations with absolute value of IRD above threshold dropped 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 No threshold IRD<=0.25 IRD <=0.15 IRD <=0.1 IRD <=0.05 
All loans 
Intermunicipal organization 0.120*** 0.0430*** 0.0310*** 0.0205*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.0360) (0.00405) (0.00265) (0.00193) (0.00106) 
Observations 14,222 11,307 9,962 8,859 6,819 
 
Short term loans 
Intermunicipal organization 0.156*** 0.0476*** 0.0319*** 0.0187*** 0.00624*** 
 (0.0449) (0.00537) (0.00339) (0.00248) (0.00125) 
Observations 9,695 6,822 5,569 4,593 3,035 
 
Annuity 
Intermunicipal organization 0.0445*** 0.0450*** 0.0369*** 0.0378*** 0.0216*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00999) (0.00984) (0.00868) (0.00480) 
Observations 312 309 292 267 229 
 
Linear 
Intermunicipal organization 0.0296*** 0.0271*** 0.0270*** 0.0224*** 0.0158*** 
 (0.00438) (0.00330) (0.00322) (0.00264) (0.00164) 
Observations 3,704 3,676 3,615 3,528 3,155 
 
Bullet 
Intermunicipal organization 0.0426*** 0.0437*** 0.0402*** 0.0304*** 0.0216*** 
 (0.00898) (0.00842) (0.00728) (0.00396) (0.00367) 
Observations 511 500 486 471 400 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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